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Abstract
From 15.01.2012 to 20.01.2012, the Seminar 12031 in Symmetric Cryptography was held in Schloss
Dagstuhl–Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented
their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the
presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put
together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links
to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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Research in Symmetric Cryptography is quickly evolving. The seminar was the third of its
kind, the first one took place in 2007, the second in 2009. We observe a steadily increasing
interest in Symmetric Cryptography, as well as a growing practical demand for symmetric
algorithms and protocols. The seminar was very successful in discussing recent results and
sharing new ideas. Furthermore, it inspired the participants to consider how Symmetric
Cryptography has evolved in the past, and how they would like it to evolve in the future.
Two intense discussions dealt with Authenticated Encryption and the issue of a ’valid’ attack
on a symmetric primitive. The participants agreed on Authenticated Encryption becoming a
major research topic for Symmetric Cryptography in the next few years, because current
Authenticated Encryption Schemes are not always suitable for practical demands – especially
are the relevant attack modes and models not yet well-understood (e.g., misuse attacks,
blockwise adaptive attacks, etc.). Regarding the issue of ’valid’ attacks, the participants
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agreed that the current development of academic cryptanalysis with a growing number of
increasingly ’marginal’ attacks, is unsatisfactory.
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3 Overview of Talks
3.1 BLAKE SIMD: past, present, future
Jean-Philippe Aumasson (Nagravision – Cheseaux, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Joint work of Aumasson, Jean-Philippe; Neves, Samuel
Main reference Third SHA-3 Conference (to appear)
The SHA-3 candidate hash function BLAKE is based on a keyed permutation whose data-level
parallelism allows implementers to exploit SIMD instructions sets, as available in popular
general-purpose processors. We will first review previous implementations that used Intel’s
streaming SIMD extensions (SSE), as well as recent implementations using ARM’s NEON
SIMD instruction set.
We will then present the recent 256-bit-wide AVX and the upcoming AVX2 extensions
(expected in 2013 in Intel’s Haswell microarchitecture) and how we used them to write new
assembly implementations of BLAKE.
3.2 Attacking KLEIN
Jean-Philippe Aumasson (Nagravision – Cheseaux, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Joint work of Aumasson, Jean-Philippe; María Naya-Plasencia; Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
Main reference J.-P. Aumasson, M. Naya-Plasencia, M.-J. O. Saarinen, “Practical Attack on 8 Rounds of the
Lightweight Block Cipher KLEIN ,” INDOCRYPT 2011, pp. 134–145, LNCS, vol. 7107, Springer,
2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_11
KLEIN is a family of lightweight block ciphers presented at RFIDSec 2011 that combines
a 4-bit Sbox with Rijndael’s byte-oriented MixColumn. This approach allows compact
implementations of KLEIN in both low-end software and hardware. We show that interactions
between those two components lead to the existence of differentials of unexpectedly high
probability: using an iterative collection of differential characteristics and neutral bits in
plaintexts, we find conforming pairs for four rounds with amortized cost below 212 encryptions,
whereas at least 230 was expected by the preliminary analysis of KLEIN. We exploit this
observation by constructing practical (≈ 235 encryptions), experimentally verified, chosen-
plaintext key-recovery attacks on up to 8 rounds of KLEIN-64 – the instance of KLEIN with
64-bit keys and 12 rounds. We also investigate the extension of the attack to 9 rounds.
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3.3 Practical Collisions in Round-Reduced Keccak
Itai Dinur (Weizmann Institute – Rehovot, IL)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference I. Dinur, O. Dunkelman, A. Shamir, “New attacks on Keccak-224 and Keccak-256,” Cryptology
ePrint Archive: Report 2011/624.
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/624.pdf
The Keccak hash function is one of the five finalists in NIST’s SHA-3 competition, and so
far it showed remarkable resistance against practical collision finding attacks: After several
years of cryptanalysis and a lot of effort, the largest number of Keccak rounds for which
actual collisions were found was only 2.
We describe improved collision finding techniques which enable us to double this number.
More precisely, we can now find within a few minutes on a single PC actual collisions in
standard Keccak-224 and Keccak-256, where the only modification is to reduce their number
of rounds to 4. When we apply our techniques to 5-round Keccak, we can get in a few days
excellent near collisions, where the Hamming distance is 5 in the case of Keccak-224 and 10 in
the case of Keccak-256. Our new attack combines differential and algebraic techniques, and
uses the fact that each round of Keccak is only a quadratic mapping in order to efficiently
find pairs of messages which follow a high probability differential characteristic.
3.4 Getting Results under Weak Expectations
Yevgeniy Dodis (New York University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Yevgeniy Dodis
Recently, there has been renewed interest in basing cryptographic primitives on weak secrets,
where the only information about the secret is some non-trivial amount of (min-)entropy.
From a formal point of view, such results require to upper bound the expectation of some
function f(X), where X is a weak source in question. We show an elementary inequality
which essentially upper bounds such “weak expectation” by two terms, the first of which
is independent of f , while the second only depends on the “variance” of f under uniform
distribution. Quite remarkably, as relatively simple corollaries of this elementary inequality,
we obtain some “unexpected” results, in several cases noticeably simplifying/improving prior
techniques for the same problem. Examples include non-malleable extractors, leakage-resilient
symmetric encryption, seed-dependent condensers and improved entropy loss for the leftover
hash lemma.
3.5 An IDEA to Consider
Orr Dunkelman (University of Haifa, IL)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Orr Dunkelman
Joint work of Biham, Eli; Keller, Nathan; Shamir, Adi
IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher with 128-bit keys which is widely used due to its inclusion in
several cryptographic packages such as PGP. After its introduction by Lai and Massey in
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1991, it was subjected to an extensive cryptanalytic effort, but so far the largest variant on
which there are any published attacks contains only 6 of its 8.5-rounds. The first 6-round
attack, described in the conference version of this paper in 2007, was extremely marginal:
It required essentially the entire codebook, and saved only a factor of two compared to the
time complexity of exhaustive search.
In 2009, Sun and Lai reduced the data complexity of the 6-round attack from 264 to
249 chosen plaintexts and simultaneously reduced the time complexity from 2127 to 2112.1
encryptions. In this revised version of our paper, we combine a highly optimized meet-in-
the-middle attack with a keyless version of the Biryukov-Demirci relation to obtain new key
recovery attacks on reduced-round IDEA, which dramatically reduce their data complexities
and increase the number of rounds to which they are applicable. In the case of 6-round
IDEA, we need only two known plaintexts (the minimal number of 64-bit messages required
to determine a 128-bit key) to perform full key recovery in 2123.4 time. By increasing the
number of known plaintexts to sixteen, we can reduce the time complexity to 2111.9, which
is slightly faster than the Sun and Lai data-intensive attack. By increasing the number of
plaintexts to about one thousand, we can now attack 6.5 rounds of IDEA, which could not be
attacked by any previously published technique. By pushing our techniques to extremes, we
can attack 7.5 rounds using 263 plaintexts and 2114 time, and by using an optimized version
of a distributive attack, we can reduce the time complexity of exhaustive search on the full
8.5-round IDEA to 2126.8 encryptions using only 16 plaintexts.
3.6 Oracle Reducibility of Hash Functions
Marc Fischlin (TU Darmstadt, DE)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Marc Fischlin
Recently, Baecher and Fischlin (Crypto 2011) used the notion of random oracle reducibility
to relate the random oracles in different schemes. Roughly, a random oracle in a scheme
B reduces to that in another scheme A if any (oracle-based or standard-model based)
instantiation of the hash function making scheme A secure, also maes scheme B secure.
Here we discuss that the same idea applies to other oracle objects such as the ideal cipher
model. In particular, we look at the constructions of hash functions (resp. compression
functions) out of ideal ciphers, and how the ideal ciphers in different constructions such as
the PGV schemes, or (Tandem-)DM compared to Hirose, relate. Our results concerning
reducibility are partially positive, and in some cases negative, showing that the hash function
constructions rely on different properties of the cipher.
3.7 GCM Security, Revisited
Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, JP)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Tetsu Iwata
Joint work of Iwata, Tetsu; Ohashi, Keisuke; Minematsu, Kazuhiko
GCM is the authenticated encryption mode developed by McGrew and Viega. In 2007,
GCM was adopted as a recommendation mode by NIST, and it is widely used in practice.
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The designers presented proofs of security, and despite extensive security analyses by the
cryptographic community, its provable security results are considered to be sound.
In this talk, we revisit the provable security results of GCM, and discuss in detail their
correctness.
3.8 Cryptanalysis of EAXprime
Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, JP)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Tetsu Iwata
Joint work of Minematsu, Kazuhiko; Morita, Hiraku; Iwata, Tetsu
Main reference K. Minematsu, S. Lucks, H. Morita, T. Iwata, “Cryptanalysis of EAXprime,” Cryptology ePrint
Archive: Report 2012/018.
URL eprint.iacr.org/2012/018.pdf
EAX’ (EAXprime) is an authenticated encryption (AE) specified by ANSI C12.22 as a
standard security function used for a smart grid. EAX’ is based on EAX, a provably secure
AE proposed by Bellare, Rogaway, and Wagner.
In this talk, we present simple and efficient forgery and distinguishing attacks against
EAX’ using one-block cleartext and plaintext.
3.9 On The Distribution of Linear Biases: Three Instructive Examples
Gregor Leander (Technical University of Denmark – Lyngby, DK)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Gregor Leander
Joint work of Abdelraheem, Mohamed Ahmed; Ågren, Martin; Beelen, Peter; Leander, Gregor
Despite the fact that we evidently have very good block ciphers at hand today, many
fundamental questions on their security are still unsolved.
One such fundamental problem is to precisely assess the security of a given block cipher
with respect to linear cryptanalysis. In by far most of the cases we have to make (clearly
wrong) assumptions, e.g., assume independent round-keys. Besides being unsatisfactory from
a scientific perspective, the lack of fundamental understanding has a direct consequence on
the performance of the ciphers we use. As we do not understand the security sufficiently
enough, we are forced to embed a security margin – from an efficiency perspective nothing else
than wasted performance. The aim of this paper is to stimulate research on the fundamental
lack of understanding of block ciphers. We do this by presenting three examples of ciphers
that behave differently to what is normally assumed. Thus, on the one hand these examples
serve as counter examples to common beliefs and on the other hand serve as a guideline for
future work.
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3.10 New Results on EAX-Prime
Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, DE)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Stefan Lucks
Main reference K. Minematsu, S. Lucks, H. Morita, T. Iwata, “Cryptanalysis of EAXprime,” Cryptology ePrint
Archive: Report 2012/018.
URL eprint.iacr.org/2012/018.pdf
Starting from previous results presented by Tetsu Iwata at this Seminar, we present an
improved cryptanalysis of EAX-Prime. The main observation is that the forgery attacks
presented by Tetsu can be extended and turned into Chosen Ciphertext Message Recovery
Attacks. These results have been found during the Seminar.
3.11 The Preimage Security of Double-Block-Length Compression
Functions
Frederik Armknecht(University Mannheim, DE)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Frederik Armknecht
Joint work of Fleischmann, Ewan; Krause, Matthias; Lee, Jooyoung; Stam, Martijn; Steinberger, John P.
Main reference F. Armknecht, E. Fleischmann, M. Krause, J. Lee, M. Stam, J. Steinberger, “The Preimage
Security of Double-Block-Length Compression Functions,” ASIACRYPT 2011, pp. 233–251, LNCS,
vol. 7073, Springer, 2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_13
We present new techniques for deriving preimage resistance bounds for block cipher based
double-block-length, double-call hash functions. We give improved bounds on the preimage se-
curity of the three ’classical’ double-block-length, double-call, block cipher-based compression
functions, these being Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose’s scheme. For Hirose’s scheme,
we show that an adversary must make at least 22n−5 block cipher queries to achieve chance
0.5 of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range. For Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM we
show that at least 22n−10 queries are necessary. These bounds improve upon the previous
best bounds of Ω(2n) queries, and are optimal up to a constant factor since the compression
functions in question have range of size 22n .
3.12 Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record
Protocol
Kenneth G. Paterson (RHUL – London, GB)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Kenneth G. Paterson
Joint work of Paterson, Kenneth G.; Ristenpart, Tom; Shrimpton, Tom
Main reference K.G. Paterson, T.E. Shrimpton, T. Ristenpart, “Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the
TLS Record Protocol,” Asiacrypt 2011, pp. 372-389, LNCS, vol. 7073, Springer, 2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25385-0_20
We analyze the security of the TLS Record Protocol, a MAC-then-Encode-then-Encrypt
(MEE) scheme whose design targets confidentiality and integrity for application layer commu-
nications on the Internet. Our main results are twofold. First, we give a new distinguishing
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attack against TLS when variable length padding and short (truncated) MACs are used. This
combination will arise when standardized TLS 1.2 extensions (RFC 6066) are implemented.
Second, we show that when tags are longer, the TLS Record Protocol meets a new
length-hiding authenticated encryption security notion that is stronger than IND-CCA.
3.13 KISS: A Bit Too Simple
Greg Rose (Qualcomm Inc. – San Diego, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Greg Rose
Main reference G. Rose, “KISS: A Bit Too Simple,” Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2011/007.
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/007.pdf
KISS (‘Keep it Simple Stupid’) is an efficient pseudo-random number generator specified
by G. Marsaglia and A. Zaman in 1993. G. Marsaglia in 1998 posted a C version to
various USENET newsgroups, including sci.crypt. Marsaglia himself has never claimed
cryptographic security for the KISS generator, but many others have made the intellectual
leap and claimed that it is of cryptographic quality. In this paper we show a number of
reasons why the generator does not meet the KISS authors’ claims, why it is not suitable for
use as a stream cipher, and that it is not cryptographically secure. Our best attack requires
about 70 words of generated output and a few hours of computation to recover the initial
state. A further attack on a newer version of KISS is also presented.
3.14 Bounds for Balanced Feistel Networks
Kyoji Shibutani (Sony – Tokyo, JP)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Kyoji Shibutani
Feistel ciphers are among the most popular block cipher constructions in use today. We
explore the optimality of balanced Feistel networks with SP-type F-functions with respect
to their resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. Instantiations of Feistel
ciphers with the wide class of (SP)u and (SP)uS F-functions is considered: One F-function
can contain an arbitrary number of S-box layers interleaved with linear diffusion. For the
matrices with maximum diffusion, it is proven that SPS and SPSP F-functions are optimal
in terms of the proportion of active S-boxes in all S-boxes – a common efficiency metric
for substitution-permutation ciphers. Interestingly, one SP-layer in the F-function is not
enough to attain optimality whereas taking more than two S-box layers does not increase
the efficiency either.
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3.15 Collisions are not Incidental: A Compression Function Exploiting
Discrete Geometry
Martijn Stam (University of Bristol, GB)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Martijn Stam
Joint work of Jetchev, Dimitar; Özen, Onur; Stam, Martijn
We present a new construction of a compression function h : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n that uses
two parallel calls to an ideal primitive (an ideal blockcipher or a public random function)
from 2n to n bits. This is similar to the well-known MDC-2 or the recently proposed MJH
by Lee and Stam (CT-RSA’11). However, unlike these constructions, we show already in
the compression function that an adversary limited (asymptotically in n) to O(22n(1−δ)/3)
queries (for any δ > 0) has disappearing advantage to find collisions.
A key component of our construction is the use of the Szemerédi–Trotter theorem over
finite fields to bound the number of full compression function evaluations an adversary can
make, in terms of the number of queries to the underlying primitives.
Moreover, for the security proof we rely on a new abstraction that refines and strengthens
existing techniques.
We believe that this framework elucidates existing proofs and we consider it of independent
interest.
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